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Abstract. The author proposes a dimensional model of our emotion concepts that is 
intended to be largely independent of one’s theory of emotions and applicable to the different 
ways in which emotions are measured. He outlines some conditions for selecting the 
dimensions based on these motivations and general conceptual grounds. Given these 
conditions he then advances an 8-dimensional model that is shown to effectively differentiate 
emotion labels both within and across cultures, as well as more obscure expressive language. 
The 8 dimensions are: (1) attracted–repulsed, (2) powerful–weak, (3) free–constrained, 
(4) certain–uncertain, (5) generalized–focused, (6) future directed–past directed, 
(7) enduring–sudden, (8) socially connected–disconnected.
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Valence
Résumé. Cet article propose un modèle dimensionnel des concepts des émotions qui soit 
indépendant d’une théorie donnée des émotions et applicable aux différentes façons de mesurer 
les émotions. L’auteur souligne les conditions de sélection des dimensions sur la base de ces 
motivations et d’ensembles conceptuels généraux. Ces conditions une fois posées, l’auteur 
propose un modèle à 8 dimensions dont il montre qu’il peut différencier à la fois dans une 
culture donnée et à travers plusieurs cultures non seulement les dénominations des émotions 
mais aussi un langage expressif moins explicite. Les 8 dimensions retenues sont: (1) attiré–
repoussé; (2) fort–faible; (3) libre–contraint;(4) certain–incertain; (5) généralisé–ciblé; 
(6) orienté vers le futur–orienté vers le passé; (7) durable–soudain; (8) socialement 
connecté–socialement déconnecté.
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1. Introduction
Identifying what emotions are requires not just a means to distinguish them 
from non-emotions but also from each other. Our language provides us with 
discrete emotion labels, but our practice here tends towards the proliferation 
of the complexity and diversity that we recognize. With several hundred 
emotion labels in the English language, let alone related affective terms,1 let 
alone metaphorical and poetic usage, we are confronted with a wonderful 
but bewildering array of phenomena. Close investigation of our language 
can uncover some order in this diversity. But our ultimate focus here is not 
so much the emotion language itself as the understanding of emotions that 
is exemplified by this language. Our goal is to find a few general concepts 
that between them describe the structure of an ‘affective space’ – the funda-
mental ways in which emotions are understood to diverge. By carefully 
defining these concepts, we can then create models or maps upon which our 
discrete emotion labels can be located in a way that reflects our best under-
standing of what makes one distinct from another.
We should note that the situating of emotions within the broader domain 
of ‘affective states’ – distinguishing emotional episodes from pleasures and 
pains, motivations, moods, long-term sentiments, dispositions and personal-
ity traits, and so on – is not treated as part of the within-emotion differentia-
tion task here (see rather Deonna & Teroni, this volume; Cochrane, 
forthcoming). Indeed this paper takes no strong position on the distinction of 
emotions from non-emotions. Instead it adopts an inclusive approach, seek-
ing to differentiate states even where their status as an emotion is unclear.
Even without a theory of the difference between emotions and non- 
emotions, defining the conceptual space has considerable potential implica-
tions with regard to measuring as well as regulating specific emotional 
responses. In particular it enables us to measure the ways in which an emo-
tion can vary – both with respect to multiple instances of a common type and 
along the course of temporal development – before we consider it replaced 
by something else. Some handle on the boundaries of emotions should also 
shed light on whether two distinct emotions can exist concurrently. A model 
of the conceptual space may also play a significant role in our studies of the 
development and function of emotions by pointing us towards the develop-
ment and function of whatever distinguishing characteristics we identify.
With the promise of such rewards, the modelling project has so far taken 
two principal forms. One is the method employed since antiquity, and 
nowadays endorsed by theorists such as Paul Ekman (e.g. 1999), in which 
emotions are grouped around certain basic emotions. From this periodic 
table of elemental states, compounds or blends can be derived that make up 
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the vast range of emotions. The other method is the use of emotion dimen-
sions, pioneered by Wundt (1897) and now championed by theorists such 
as James Russell (e.g. 1980, 2003) as well as appraisal theorists such as 
Ira Roseman (e.g. 1984; Roseman & Evdokas, 2004) and Klaus Scherer 
(e.g. Scherer, Dan & Flykt, 2006). Here emotions are plotted along several 
descriptive axes, the crucial difference with the basic emotions model being 
that the dimensional terms are not themselves emotions. In this paper I 
explore the dimensional view, comparing my analysis to some of the models 
employed in the contemporary scientific literature, but specifically focusing 
on our emotion concepts, and guided by certain conceptual ideals (detailed 
below).2
There are a number of attractions to the dimensional approach. In particu-
lar the idea of plotting emotions along dimensions respects a fundamental 
observation that emotions can vary very smoothly, both as they progress in 
time and from case to case. Moreover emotions do not simply vary; the 
information they provide is typically dynamic in content, responding to a 
world that is constantly changing. For instance one fears not just a future 
event but an event that is approaching ever closer in time. Or one feels one’s 
body not just to be weak but getting weaker. In this way the concepts we use 
for dimensions can be conceived as trajectories along which our status is 
constantly developing.
The other advantages of the dimensional perspective relate to language. 
The focus of the present analysis is our conception of emotions, which, if not 
fully determined by our language (à la linguistic relativism), is at least most 
manifestly realized by it. Yet extracting dimensions from this language can 
allow us to transcend its constraints to some extent. We can recognize general 
paths in our thinking that we can follow to unmapped corners of emotion 
experience, some examples of which are provided at the end of this paper.
A related point is that, by breaking down emotion terms into descriptive 
terms, we can to some extent side-step worries about whether different peo-
ple both within and across cultures mean the same thing by an emotion term. 
Of course this then shifts the worry onto the descriptive terms. Yet it is more 
permissible to prescriptively fix the meaning of such terms as, by breaking 
down the emotion phenomenon, we move closer towards simply pointing to 
certain observable components. To some extent establishing a few general 
and abstract dimensions is a step towards the Semantic Metalanguage envi-
sioned by Wierzbicka (1986), with which any emotion word in any language 
can be defined through a set of universal semantic primes. Moreover, where 
the dimensions are applied to the subjective feeling of emotions, they can be 
of considerable help when attempting to describe that experience, giving the 
lie to the commonplace that feelings defy description.3
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In none of these respects are we served by the basic emotions model. 
Naturally this need not imply that the richness of our emotional lives does not 
in fact derive from a few biologically discrete types. But whether this is the 
case or whether indeed there are real analogue components that correspond 
to the dimensions we identify (or both) is a question that best follows agree-
ment concerning what we mean when we say that ‘he is angry’ or ‘she is sad’. 
Thus our goal here is to map the conceptual space of emotions as faithfully 
and efficiently as possible – and moreover to do this without presupposing 
any particular theory about what emotions are. Quite the contrary, it is hoped 
that the model offered here will be a useful tool for researchers, regardless of 
the theory of emotions they hold, and will apply equally to whatever compo-
nent of emotion is of interest, be it appraisals, emotion language, subjective 
feeling, physiological changes, expressive behaviours, action tendencies or 
regulation strategies. Thus, where some dimensional models such as those of 
Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum (1957) or Russell (1980) concentrate on feeling 
states, or appraisal components (e.g. Scherer, Dan & Flykt, 2006), the present 
model is aimed at integrating different approaches by capturing the meaning 
of the emotion at a fairly abstract level.
Of course this focus on our conception of emotions is potentially very 
broad. With regard to language for instance, it can include any and all words 
used to describe an emotion episode (e.g. how long it lasts, where it happens 
and so on). But in practical terms, the dimensions I provide will apply most 
centrally to the emotion labels themselves, with the relevance of the dimen-
sions receding as we move towards less affect-laden terminology.
2. Conditions for the dimension model
Below I introduce an 8-dimensional model that seems to represent the 
minimal structure required to effectively capture the range of our emotion 
concepts and which has the capacity to differentiate even near-synonymous 
emotion terms. But before that can be done, it is necessary to outline the 
conditions these dimensions are designed to meet. The primary motivation 
is to show how dimensions apply to emotions in a way that is applicable to 
different research methodologies and intuitive for non-experts to use. The 
secondary motivation is to adhere to certain conceptual ideals or virtues 
about what a dimension model should look like if it is to best serve these 
requirements of generality and intuitive use.
Thus there are two ways in which the proposed model may be rejected: if 
it has not properly satisfied the below conditions and if the conditions them-
selves are not accepted. I acknowledge that researchers may have different 
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priorities to those outlined by the below conditions. They might seek a low 
number of dimensions or a model that addresses a specific research method-
ology (focusing on behaviour for instance). But it does seem generally desir-
able that one’s model be as conceptually clear as possible and explicitly 
address what features are regarded as essential to a dimension model.
2.1 Initial logical conditions
The following conditions outline some conceptual standards for using 
dimensional axes to describe some phenomenon.
2.1.1 True-scale condition. No emotion can simultaneously occupy more 
than one position on a dimension. Any property targeted by a dimension 
must form a true scale, such that a phenomenon can occupy only a single 
point along that scale at a given moment. Similarly, if bi-polar dimensions 
are utilized, then the terms for the extremes should be genuine, mutually 
exclusive opposites, e.g. to the degree that an emotion is pleasant, it must 
not also be unpleasant. Were we then to discover an episode that simultane-
ously outputted two distinct values along a single variable, we could sup-
pose the existence of a genuinely mixed emotion.
Note, however, that some emotions may be defined with less specificity 
than others, such that they appear to spread across a range of possible values 
(across different occasions for example). But we would anticipate that, 
where the emotion is conceived in a more refined manner, it will output a 
more refined value.
2.1.2 Analogue condition. If an emotion can occupy distinct discrete points on 
a dimension, then it should be able to occupy positions in between those points. 
If one is to use a dimensional model for emotions as opposed to, say, a numeri-
cal matrix of possible states, then one must conceive of emotions as fairly ana-
logue entities. That is, whatever enables us to attribute a dimensional value to an 
emotion episode must be something that we can recognize to a greater or lesser 
extent. Naturally we anticipate some finite limit on the degree with which a 
dimension can be refined, but, in so far as objective measurements or self- 
reports manage to distinguish emotional events, the range of possible values 
seems sufficiently vast to warrant the use of analogue variables.
2.1.3 Independence condition. Occupying a position on a dimension must 
not entail a position on another dimension. This is perhaps the most impor-
tant and potentially controversial of the initial conditions. If occupying a 
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point on one dimension limits the range of points that an emotion can 
occupy on another dimension, then those two dimensions are not mutually 
independent. One can ensure that this condition is met by checking whether, 
for any candidate dimension, it is possible to imagine emotions that occupy 
the extremes of that dimension, whilst also occupying the extreme or neutral 
positions on any other candidate dimension. If this is not possible, then one 
should discard or redefine at least one of the candidate dimensions.
The potential controversy of this condition lies in the fact that it under-
mines any model that utilizes both the valence/pleasantness dimension and 
activity/arousal dimension. The reason for this is that it is implausible that 
one is in an extremely pleasant or unpleasant state at the same time as being 
minimally or even moderately aroused.4 The positioning of emotions on the 
‘circumplex’ models advanced by both James Russell (e.g. 2003) and Lisa 
Feldman Barrett (e.g. Barrett & Russell, 1999) should in fact resemble a 
V-shaped distribution comparable to the vertical intensity dimension of 
Robert Plutchik’s multidimensional model of the emotions (1982).5
Yet the use of these two dimensions is extremely popular. They are both 
highly applicable to emotions and easily measurable. Of course the fact that 
overlapping dimensions can be usefully employed is no guarantee that they 
are the best way to map the conceptual space of emotions. There are several 
reasons to prefer a model with independent dimensions. First, such a model 
ensures that the conceptual space is mapped efficiently and that none of 
one’s dimensions are made redundant by the combination of other dimen-
sions. Second, if one’s dimensions overlap, this may well result in the 
neglect of emotions that would fall into the extreme positions of dimensions 
more independently conceived. Thus a model with independent dimensions 
has more explanatory power. Third, independent dimensions reflect our 
ordinary understanding of this mathematical analogy: that dimensions are 
ways in which things can fail to coincide, or diverge from each other.6 
Overlapping dimensions only partially satisfy this ideal.
An additional advantage of independent dimensions is that one can infer 
from them the possibility of distinct emotion-generating components sup-
porting those dimensions, which would not be possible with non-independent 
dimensions (cf. the research project launched by Scherer, 1984). Of course 
it may be the case that no truly independent functions underlie the genera-
tion of emotions and, similarly, that it is not possible to arrive at a set of 
independent dimensions that effectively capture the variation in our emotion 
concepts. But, if a model with independent dimensions can be found, then 
for the reasons given above it is prima facie a stronger model.
It is in pursuit of this ideal then that I abandon one of two traditional 
dimensions. I identify the arousal/activation dimension as the main culprit 
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for the observed overlapping. Applying a dimension of activation to emo-
tions is like applying a dimension of ‘being coloured’ to colours. It is far too 
general.7 Although the degree of arousal is highly applicable to emotions, it 
is not doing much conceptually useful work for us. Thus I would be more 
prepared to jettison this dimension than the dimension of valence (though I 
raise doubts about valence on other grounds below). In any event, it is plau-
sible that the intensity of arousal is a factor intrinsically bound up with all 
the component functions involved in emotions. The degree of positive or 
negative valence already captures one aspect of the degree of arousal and, 
as I show below, other dimensions do likewise. Thus, between them, the set 
of eight independent dimensions that I provide make the arousal dimension 
redundant. The sorts of distinctions it can help us to make, between anger 
and rage for instance, can be equally captured by dimensions such as the 
‘power’ dimension I discuss below.
2.2 Relevance conditions
The following conditions are less conceptually based than those already 
outlined. They are intended to formally clarify the goals of differentiating 
our emotion concepts.
2.2.1 Cross-domain condition. Each dimension should be applicable to 
each of the areas in which we recognize emotions, without excluding or 
prejudicing any area. By structuring our conception of emotions, the formu-
lation of a dimensional model is an initial stage in clarifying the field under 
investigation. If we find that genuinely independent dimensions can accu-
rately capture our emotion concepts, then that provides some support for the 
claim that independent components corresponding to those dimensions are 
in fact at work in realizing the outputted state. But given the disagreement 
of various theorists concerning what factors most essentially constitute emo-
tions (the principal candidates being appraisals, action tendencies or subjec-
tive bodily feelings), it is inappropriate to assume when constructing one’s 
dimensions that any factor of emotions is more relevant and thus more 
important to differentiate than any another. Moreover, if we wish the model 
to provide a useful tool, we should ideally arrive at dimensions that are 
relevant to the manifestation of emotion in whatever form it takes. As a 
result, the descriptive terms used should be abstract enough for us to locate 
examples amongst all the different ways in which emotions are manifested 
(appraisal, emotion language, experienced feeling, physiology, expressive 
behaviour, action tendencies and regulation strategies).
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It is due to this condition that some doubts can be raised about the self-
report method typically employed to derive dimensional models. To take one 
of the better examples, the study by Fontaine et al. (2007) asked participants 
to rate 24 emotion terms on 144 different features (the GRID instrument). 
Clearly some pains were taken to employ a fair distribution of emotion fea-
tures, yet even here only 22 subjective-feeling features were used, in com-
parison to 40 action-tendency features. Moreover, although 29 of the GRID 
features can be construed as socially related,8 a category of social features 
was not recognized (and thus balanced against other features).
This unbalance is a consequence of deriving features based on what has 
frequently come up in the scientific literature. The problem with this method 
is that the constraints of empirical research encourage a bias towards clearly 
observable features like actions (rather than sometimes-obscure subjective 
feelings) and the solitary individual as the unit of study rather than the more 
complex group.9 One wonders how the results would have differed if fea-
tures had been derived from the expressive poetry of the last century instead. 
At any rate, the different ways in which we discern emotional states should 
be explicitly balanced in these kinds of studies.
2.2.2 Counter-example condition. No two emotions that we consider quite 
distinct should be found close to each other. This condition is simply a way 
to check a dimension model against one’s intuitions. If one’s candidate 
dimensions are not able to differentiate two emotions that are intuitively 
very distinct, then one has reason either to discard one’s model or to add a 
dimension that more effectively differentiates them. Informally one can be 
guided in this respect by our most common emotion terms, as it is reason-
able to suppose that they are so common because they are relatively easy to 
distinguish. Preferably there should be at least one dimension upon which 
these distinct terms are direct opposites.
This condition is again an important source of objections to current mod-
els. In the Russell/Barrett model, for instance, it is quite possible for cases 
of fear, anger, jealousy, disgust, stress, grief, envy, contempt and embarrass-
ment to all occupy the same point in affective space. Russell (2003: 154) has 
responded to this objection by claiming that his dimensions measure ‘core 
affect’, and that accordingly they need not differentiate these emotions. 
Rather, differentiating these emotions requires of the subject some addi-
tional interpretation on the basis of contextual factors. Apart from the 
implausible claim that our bodily feelings of anger, sadness and fear cannot 
be immediately distinguished without contextual interpretation (see the 
introductory article in this issue for discussion), Russell has simply aban-
doned any claim to be using dimensions to differentiate emotions.
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The model of Fontaine et al. (2007) is also affected, though to a lesser 
extent than the Russell/Barrett model. This model supposes the existence of 
(at least) four dimensions: pleasantness, potency/control, activation/arousal 
and predictability. However, it looks like many cases of fear and sadness 
could be equally unpleasant, lacking in control, predictable10 and aroused. 
Although the study does not claim to exhaustively differentiate the emo-
tions, this overlap is hardly insignificant. These are two of the most common 
emotion concepts in English, as well as many other languages studied (e.g. 
Hupka, Lenton & Hutchison, 1999). It is a minimal requirement that our 
model should differentiate them.
2.2.3 Clarity condition. Each dimension must be unambiguously defined. 
If we are to succeed in our collective investigation into the emotions, then it 
is essential that our terms of analysis should be commonly and rigorously 
applied. Unfortunately this is not always so, and the problem is intensified 
when non-expert subjects are called upon to apply these terms. In the case 
of emotion dimensions, the most notorious example is valence. The philoso-
pher Robert Solomon (2006) was able to locate 17 possible interpretations 
of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ including ratings of pleasure, virtue, social sta-
tus, health, and degree of stimulation – many of which can result in entirely 
contradictory ratings.11 As a result he concluded that the distinction is overly 
simplistic and should not be employed.
Yet the problem with Solomon’s response is that the sense in which some-
thing is positive or negative, good or bad, is ubiquitous in our thinking about 
emotions (and indeed much else), as is evidenced by numerous statistical 
analyses in which valence consistently comes out as the primary factor (e.g. 
Fillenbaum & Rapoport, 1971; Bush, 1973; Averill, 1975; Bottenberg, 1975; 
Herrmann & Raybeck, 1981; Lutz, 1982; Russell, 1983; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985; Storm & Storm, 1987; Gehm & Scherer, 1988; Russell, Lewicka & 
Niit, 1989; Fontaine et al., 2007; Galati et al., 2008). For this reason it would 
be more appropriate to specify the concept more exactly, so that possible 
differences in interpretation do not confound experimental results. We can 
arbitrarily decide upon one particular interpretation if necessary, though, for 
the sake of getting different researchers to agree, locating a central definition 
would be preferable.
The best way to unambiguously define one’s dimensions is to correlate 
them with clearly observable features. For instance one could correlate 
valence with the fairly unambiguous behaviour of either approaching or 
avoiding a stimulus. But since we are also interested in emotional experi-
ence accessed by self-report, behaviours should feature only as one possible 
manifestation of the concept. Again the idea of pleasure–displeasure is often 
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used in the literature, but this now prejudices feeling. As a result, I will 
advance a dimension of valence below that is defined functionally. Hopefully 
this will be suitably clear, yet intuitive enough for non-experts to apply.
2.3 Naturalistic constraints
The final set of conditions that I offer are ways to check that one’s candidate 
dimensions are relevant to the field of emotions as a whole and our particu-
lar emotion concepts in particular. Otherwise one might come up with all 
kinds of dimensions like ‘red–not red’ which, whilst satisfying the condi-
tions above, are not usefully applied to the emotions.
2.3.1 Applicability condition. Every dimension should be applicable to 
every emotion. A candidate dimension may not be profoundly relevant to 
every emotion that one can think of, but it should at least be applicable, such 
that specific emotion episodes can be given specific values on that dimen-
sion as they progress. Nor should any emotion be neutral on all dimensions 
(unless one is referring to total neutral calm).
In practicality we should prefer dimensions that apply to more, if not all, 
of our emotion terms.12 For instance, the dimension of ‘socially connected–
disconnected’ advanced below is not particularly relevant to all imaginable 
emotions, but does manage to cover a wider range of emotions than a dimen-
sion like ‘other attacking–protecting’.
2.3.2 Fixed identity condition. Labelled emotions should remain relatively 
static on at least some dimensions. Due to the broad nature of at least our 
common emotion labels, which allow many different tokens to fall under a 
single type, we should not expect to attribute them a fixed point on every 
dimension. Single episodes are also likely to fluctuate along our dimensions 
as they progress through their temporal envelope. However, if an emotion 
has been successfully labelled, then we should expect it to remain fairly 
static on at least one dimension. Otherwise one’s dimensions have not suc-
ceeded in capturing whatever semantically stable fact about the emotion 
enables the linguistic community to label it. The only exception to this rule 
is perhaps generalized arousal. Particular cases of arousal may well sit at 
particular points on the dimensions. Yet the general concept of arousal is so 
broad that it may not be possible to narrow its range on the dimensions.
2.3.3 Naturalism condition. Our emotion terms should be spread relatively 
evenly throughout the various dimensions. This condition is purely heuristic. 
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I noted above that our discovery of dimensions will help us to transcend the 
limits of our language to some extent by allowing us to recognize unmapped 
possibilities in the conceptual space. And certainly our emotion language is 
not driven towards filling out the conceptual space so much as recognizing 
cultural saliencies, frequencies of experience and so on. Yet, given that lan-
guage diversifies over time (current estimates of the English language range 
from around half a million to well over a million words; see Grimond, 
2008), we can expect that more and more subtle distinctions will accumu-
late. In addition, given the focus of emotion dimensions on our emotion 
concepts, the same motivations that drive the lexicalization of emotional 
phenomena also drive the choice of dimensions, i.e. frequency of use (dis-
tinguishing common terms), and salience for the speaker. Thus, although we 
can expect that, as a consequence of cultural preoccupations, our emotion 
terms will bunch or clump together upon the dimensions to some extent, it 
is plausible that the more emotion terms one takes into account, the more 
likely they are to spread evenly across the dimensions that are designed to 
map them.13
Note that this condition may only allow us to reject a dimension in fairly 
extreme cases (such as a dimension of ‘being afraid of heights or not’), and 
in general we would need to be confident that our inputted data is reasonably 
diverse. To give an example, one of the dimensions advanced in Fontaine 
et al. (2007: 1055) is predictability. When they plot their emotion terms on 
this dimension, nearly all the terms clump together towards the neutrally 
predictable range, with surprise sticking out on its own in the highly unpre-
dictable range. Yet since only 24 emotion terms were analysed, the plausible 
response is that the distribution would become more even as more terms are 
added or, in other words, that the initial choice of terms was unbalanced in 
this respect.14 So in practicality, such a gap is a reason to suspect either the 
inputted terms or the dimensions employed.
3. Methodology
3.1 Methodological priorities
With these conditions in mind, I could begin to formally justify my choice 
of dimensions. Of course the choices of a single philosopher may not seem 
especially reliable to those steeped in experimental methodology. Yet a sig-
nificant advantage of this approach was that I was not limited to a small 
number of emotion terms as my input set. Rather the dimensions I selected 
had to fit any emotion that I could imagine.
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In addition, although I was influenced by the conceptual ideals outlined 
above, my method was inductive and I respected the experimental evidence 
as much as possible. That is, the numerous factorial analyses were impres-
sive enough to convince me to first of all consider the dimensions of valence, 
arousal and potency/control. Moreover, the evidence that some dimensions 
account for more variance than others in Fontaine et al. (2007) – despite the 
limitations in the input set noted above – gave reason to follow their order 
of priority. By subjecting these dimensions to the conditions outlined above, 
particularly the counter-example condition and the independence condition, 
I could then add, modify or reject dimensions. Also, sharpening up the defi-
nitions of these candidate dimensions led me to split some of the dimensions 
in two.
Given that our emotion concepts centre around our emotion labels, the 
second methodological priority was to differentiate the most common emo-
tion terms found in the English language, i.e. fear, sadness, anger, happiness 
and so on. I am aware that this method may undermine the universality of my 
model. It is possible that not all of these emotion labels (as least as a unified 
category) may be found in other cultures. Yet their prioritization within the 
selection method may well bias which dimensions are chosen, even if ulti-
mately one’s dimensions are checked against every possible emotion. This is 
because in practice one applies the independence condition by generally try-
ing to preserve whatever dimensions are currently selected and then looking 
for dimensions orthogonal to those. If I were to begin with a different set of 
candidate dimensions and a different set of initial emotions, then perhaps a 
different set of dimensions might emerge. And these dimensions might func-
tion equally well, if not better, in differentiating the field as a whole. I invite 
readers to try the process for themselves and see if any convergence results.
A third methodological priority was to look for factors that are fundamen-
tal to our concepts in general. In particular, it has been observed by philoso-
phers since Kant that we cannot help but situate our experiences in space and 
time. Thus I sought to apply these concepts to the emotions. The temporal 
dimensions of duration and flow fitted easily, reflecting the strongly temporal 
nature of the emotions. The concept of space, on the other hand, could only 
be applied with some reinterpretation. In the case of emotions, the relevant 
spatial contrasts are not height, breadth and width, but internal and external 
to the body (or the more abstract ‘self’). These concepts are exemplified in 
my dimensions of personal strength and freedom, respectively.
In addition to space and time, it also became clear that our sense of cause 
and effect is fundamental to our understanding of the world. This is captured 
by two dimensions: one of probability, or our sense of how things might 
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have been different; and one of generality, that is, the sense in which a cause 
or effect shapes multiple objects or is narrowly focused on a single detail. 
Finally, while it may not be essential to the experience of all living things, 
one’s status as a social creature, as one being amongst many, is basic to the 
human condition. Our survival as a species is driven to a large extent by our 
collaborative capacities. It seemed obvious then that at least one dimension 
concerning our social relations should be applicable to the emotions.
A final formal aspect of my method of selection was that, if a dimension 
could be found that matched the conditions above, then I would add it, even 
if its impact on differentiating the field was relatively slight. That is, if the 
proposed dimension was minimally relevant, then there was no reason to 
exclude it. My model contains eight dimensions, and perhaps some readers 
will regard this as an unacceptable inflation. Nevertheless, it is more impor-
tant to the goals of this study that the emotions are efficiently differentiated 
than that the total number of dimensions is of a more manageable size. 
Moreover, although I am unable to imagine any more dimensions that do not 
overlap to some degree with those already selected, I am not able to assert 
with much certainty that more dimensions are unavailable. I can only say 
that, as far as I can tell, the counter-example condition has been met, such 
that even near synonyms can be differentiated in the system.
The above constraints allowed me to proceed in a fairly rigorous manner. 
Yet, even given all of these factors, it cannot be denied that a certain amount 
of serendipity attended the choice of these dimensions. Beyond the most 
obvious labels, one is left to consider all the possibilities that one can 
imagine. Two of the dimensions (generality and probability) were suggested 
by colleagues (Ruthger Righart and Klaus Scherer, respectively). On reflec-
tion, these could meet my conditions and helpfully distinguish a few prob-
lematic cases. Moreover they led me to realize the importance of our 
fundamental concepts of cause and effect to emotions. Another way in 
which the final selection was more art than science was that, due to the 
independence condition, I had to consider the balance of the overall set of 
dimensions. This demanded a fine-tuning process, trying out various defini-
tions until some could be found that elegantly captured the range of relevant 
qualities, while avoiding stepping on each others’ toes.
3.2 The homogeneity of the dimensions
As noted above, the dimensions selected are homogeneous with respect to 
capturing certain basic conditions of human experience: one’s sense of time, 
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one’s sense of bodily space, one’s sense of causation and one’s sense of 
social connectedness. None of these dimensions are especially emotional in 
tone. They are just fundamental ways in which the world is presented to us. 
However, in addition to these concepts, we have the dimension of valence, 
which is specifically affective in nature. It is this dimension that helps to 
focus the set as a whole on the domain of emotions, because one’s senses 
of inner space, social connectedness, duration, etc., become modulated by 
one’s sense of goodness or badness. In this way, the overall set of dimen-
sions should cover the full range of human experience whilst remaining 
relatively focused around the emotions.15 It is in consideration of the gener-
ality of these concepts that we can be fairly sure that no more dimensions 
are likely to be needed, or least none that do not overlap to some extent with 
those already selected (though one could perhaps drop all of the dimensions 
and find a larger set of narrower terms).
The second respect in which the selected dimensions are homogeneous 
concerns their targeting of the intentional object of the emotion. I have already 
noted that the aim of this analysis is to generate a model that can apply to 
emotions in whatever form they take (feelings, behaviours, appraisals, etc.). 
This leads me to prefer abstract definitions. Yet one can still specify that each 
of the dimensions should present some meaningful information to the subject. 
That emotions have intentional meaning is perhaps the only consistently 
endorsed position in the philosophical literature on the emotions (e.g. de 
Sousa, 1987; Goldie, 2000; Prinz, 2004; Deonna, 2006; Solomon, 2007; 
Teroni, 2007; Döring, 2009). Thus, for each emotion concept, one should be 
able to ask how things are given to the subject by each dimension.
Note that the intentional object of the emotion need not be its eliciting 
conditions, but whatever the subject happens to focus on during the emotional 
episode. Note also that this need not require conscious experience. One’s 
unconscious behaviour for instance could still be responding to a threat, and in 
this sense presenting the world as dangerous or one’s body as relatively unpro-
tected. Similarly one’s bodily feelings could indicate a sense of weakness or 
vulnerability. However, what this sort of definition does rule out is describing 
those behaviours or feelings as mere responses, without a sense of what the 
response entails about the status of the subject. Thus, although the dimension 
definitions I outline are broad enough to apply to the various ways in which 
emotions are manifested, they remain focused on the meaning of the emotion.
4. The emotion dimensions
The eight selected emotion dimensions are now defined in detail.
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4.1. Valence (attracted–repulsed)
As I have mentioned above, the overlap between arousal and valence led me 
to discard the arousal dimension. Though one might argue that the valence 
dimension should be discarded instead, I was persuaded by the observation 
that the arousal dimension overlaps with most other dimensions that one can 
think of. Its generality is a positive hindrance when attempting to efficiently 
differentiate the field. I was then finally convinced by the prioritization of 
valence in various factor-analytic studies.
I have also noted that I did not wish to prejudice either the behavioural or 
felt aspects of emotions with a definition of valence that referred directly to 
either. Russell (2003) amongst others appeals instead to ‘simple hedonic 
tone’. I must confess that I hardly know what is meant by ‘hedonic tone’, let 
alone ‘simple’ hedonic tone. It sounds like a fancy way of saying ‘pleasur-
able’. Moreover I sincerely have no idea what simple hedonic tone feels 
like. On introspection I find only various particular sensory pleasures, all of 
which are contingent upon the context. Sweet tastes for instance become 
decidedly non-pleasurable when one is nauseous from having eaten too 
many sweets. Perhaps pain is intrinsically unpleasant, though people with 
pain asymbolia claim to no longer ‘suffer’ pains despite having the same 
sensations (Grahek, 2007). It is hard to know what to make of these claims, 
but it looks like sensations and valence can be distinguished, even if a given 
qualitative sensation can seem immediately good or bad.
Instead I propose a strictly functional definition of valence, defined as any 
response to the detection of a stimulus which is designed to increase or 
decrease the presence of that stimulus. In this way the response presents its 
object as attractive or repulsive. For example, if one feels pain, then one’s 
body will react to ameliorate the source of pain either by removing one’s body 
from harm’s way, initiating healing processes, or releasing pain-relieving 
chemicals. Similarly, if one tastes something pleasant, then one will in gen-
eral behave in ways that increase the presence of that taste, such as eating 
more or ensuring one has the money to acquire more in the future. Again, if 
one achieves an important goal or has one’s self-worth confirmed, then one 
may be inclined to orient one’s attention towards one’s success by thinking 
about it a lot, or to preserve whatever one has attained (a milder form of 
attraction). The valent response can take the form of internal physiological 
responses, instrumental actions, expressive or verbal behaviour, or the ori-
entation of attention. It can occur in moments or endure for many years. 
Thus, although this definition is similar to Roseman’s (1984; Roseman & 
Evdokas, 2004) dimension of appetitive–aversive, it is not identical since it 
is not exclusively focused on reducing pains and increasing pleasures.16
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With this abstract definition, we can also avoid the problem raised by the 
observation that sometimes ‘positive’ emotions involve ‘negative’ responses. 
For instance, critics point to certain cases of romantic love in which the 
subject will at times avoid the loved one. Yet, in the case of ‘playing hard to 
get’, we assume that the lover’s avoidance behaviour is ultimately designed 
to increase the presence of the loved one in his or her life. The loved one is 
thereby a positively valenced stimulus, a source of attraction, regardless of 
the intermediate strategy used to regulate this stimulus. Alternatively, if the 
lover is simply too overwhelmed to face the loved one, then we can fairly 
describe this as the consequence of a negative, repulsed emotion, anxiety for 
instance, which can sometimes be part of the narrative of an enduring state 
like love. Here the longer-term state would be mapped as fluctuating in 
valence as the subject progresses through time.
4.2 Personal strength (powerful–weak)
The dimension of potency, control or power has been popular since Osgood’s 
(e.g. 1957) general analysis of affective structure in the meaning of lexical 
items. In particular, it is an extremely useful way to distinguish the emotions 
of fear and anger, which typically have equal valence. However, the notion 
is often ambiguously defined. Scherer, Dan & Flykt (2006: 93), suggesting 
an alignment with Scherer’s appraisal dimension of ‘goal conduciveness’, 
similarly note a lack of homogeneity. As in the case of valence, different 
interpretations could potentially confound experimental results. Thus I sug-
gest that we split up potency/control/power into more clearly defined dimen-
sions. First, let us identify a dimension of power, which we must distinguish 
from mere intensity of feeling. A ‘powerful’ feeling can be easily miscon-
strued as merely a ‘strong’ feeling rather than a feeling of strength. But, as 
I argued in my discussion of the arousal dimension, intensity of feeling is 
something that should be equally applicable to all dimensions. On the defi-
nition I prefer, someone in a state of intense panic would be judged as 
extremely weak, despite their generally intense activity and high levels of 
physiological arousal. Again, distinguishing this from intense feelings of 
strength allows us to recognize one aspect of arousal.
We can further reduce power with the help of an example. Where on the 
power dimension would we place an enraged prisoner struggling against his 
chains? On one reading, he lacks power because he is completely unable to 
free himself, to achieve his desires. He might lack even the ability to move. 
Yet, on another reading, his energetic struggle, straining muscles and shouts 
of rage suggest an extremely powerful state. On the basis of this sort of 
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example (and anger in general) I think we should distinguish power from the 
sense of freedom. Power, and its opposite weakness, is analogous to a read-
out of battery-level on an electronic device. It is a sense of one’s energy and 
strength, one’s internal reserves for action and potentially the environmental 
and social supports that give one the strength to endure. It is signalled by 
secure postures, a steady voice and self-defending appraisals. This sense of 
power then feeds directly into a sense of resilience or resistance to the vicis-
situdes of circumstance. In this sense the prisoner is powerful.
4.3 Freedom (free–constrained)
Meanwhile freedom, and its opposite, constraint, here signify the capacity of 
a subject to get what he wants, the sense of space or the openness of the world 
to his goals. The sense of freedom is signalled by a more relaxed posture, a 
greater variety of activity, or impulsive behaviour in extreme cases. The sense 
of freedom can also be generally associated with our capacity for affordance 
perception, the manner in which, when perceiving objects, we also perceive 
the ways in which they can be manipulated (cf. Gibson, 1979). So given this 
definition, our prisoner may be extremely high on the power dimension but he 
would be extremely low on the freedom dimension.17 The dimension of free-
dom is also useful in distinguishing a certain kind of righteous anger from joy, 
where both may be equally positive and equally powerful, but where joy 
involves a much greater sense that the world lies open before one.
This reduction of freedom and power to two dimensions still leaves out 
one significant source of potency, which is a feeling of dominance (and its 
opposite, submissiveness) over one’s physical or social environment, 
including the relative tendency to aggressive behaviour. I think that domi-
nance is a complex case. When one is unquestioned master of a situation, 
then one dominates that situation. In this respect one can do whatever one 
wants, and one has a sense of affordances of a social or environmental 
nature (i.e. freedom). At the same time, however, the support that the envi-
ronment offers is one that increases one’s strength.
Similarly when one is acting submissively, there is a sense in which one 
is receptive – one is not actor, but acted upon – negating the sense of free-
dom. But simultaneously one’s receptivity may be a matter of seeking help 
or the increase of resources to boost one’s power level. Thus I regard domi-
nance not as definitive of either the power or freedom dimensions but as an 
example case in which both dimensions have been combined. Depending on 
exactly what aspects of the situation are emphasized, we might apply either 
or both dimensions.
396  Social Science Information Vol 48 – no 3
4.4 Probability (certain–uncertain)
I have already mentioned the dimension of predictability suggested in 
Fontaine et al. (2007). The best interpretation of this dimension seems to be 
the sense in which the event that triggered the emotion was predictable or 
not. For instance the predictability of someone’s insulting behaviour makes 
me sad. However, it is more central to the experience of this emotion to 
focus on the insulting behaviour itself. And in general the trigger (predicta-
ble or not) of an emotion need not be its focus. For example to see a highly 
familiar (and hence predictable) school tie might send one off into reveries 
about one’s school days, while the school tie itself is long forgotten.
Instead of predictability then, I suggest a related but more abstract dimen-
sion of probability. Similarly to several other theorists (Roseman, 1984; Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1985; Scherer, Dan & Flykt, 2006), this is described as the 
degree to which the intentional focus of the emotion seems certain or uncer-
tain. It is important to note, however, that this concept need not refer to the 
anticipation of some event prior to its occurrence. Instead one can have a more 
general sense of contingency. One can consider the degree to which things 
could go differently or could have gone differently. To what extent are alterna-
tives available? This is possible even if it does not occur to one to consider an 
event’s contingency until long after the event, or indeed if one acknowledges 
that one could never have realized this contingency at the time.
The sense of contingency is important for characterizing emotions like 
thankfulness/gratitude, regret, relief and worry. For instance an important 
aspect of regret is the sense that one could, or should, have prevented whatever 
happened. Similarly one worries about whether or not a future event will actu-
ally occur, or is relieved when the unwelcome possibility is averted. Moreover 
at the other extreme we find an interesting class of emotions characterized by 
a sense of inevitability, such as doom, optimism, pessimism, the feeling of 
doing something for which one was ‘destined’ or the need to bow to tradition. 
Overall, this dimension can be associated with our capacity for counterfactual 
reasoning, essential to our sense of causation. It is also signalled by the degree 
of resistance behaviours or the openness to alternative courses of action.
4.5 Intentional focus (generalized–focused)
Accompanying the concept of probability in our understanding of the causal 
nature of the world is the sense of generality, whereby one differentiates 
the degree to which a specific cause is responsible for one’s status. At the 
extreme of generality, we find states like intense paranoia or confidence 
Cochrane Eight dimensions for the emotions  397
(assuming episodic states of such rather than dispositions).18 We may also 
use this dimension to distinguish moods from emotion episodes which, it is 
sometimes claimed (e.g. Prinz, 2004: 182–8), are about everything (one’s 
life in general) rather than nothing.19 Meanwhile some of the emotions most 
associated with focus are surprise, shock, disgust, pride, relief and romantic 
love. The traditional concept of romantic love for instance may target its 
object so exactly that intuitively one could not love another even if that 
person were qualitatively identical to one’s beloved in physical and mental 
characteristics (i.e. the kind of case depicted in the film/book Solaris).
Overall, this dimension is most relevant to the way one orients one’s 
attention within the emotion episode. In particular, does one’s emotion target 
one or many objects? It is the difference between focusing on a single fault 
and remembering all the times one has been wronged (our emotions often 
fluctuate in intentional focus in this way). Or it is the difference between 
having some specific enemy or resentment towards everyone in a social 
group. Similarly one’s responses to the world can signal a general or focused 
attitude: the difference between rage towards some particularly detested 
object and a consistently destructive attitude, for instance.
Note also that, while extreme generality and focus correspond to another 
aspect of emotional intensity, neither extreme necessarily indicates intense 
bodily activation. On the extremely focused side, one might have a mild 
worry about something very particular, comparable to a small but attention-
grabbing injury to one’s little finger. On the generalized side, one might 
have an extremely nebulous uneasiness about one’s situation.
4.6 Temporal flow (future directed–current–past directed)
The temporal nature of the emotions is an effective way to differentiate the 
field and highly suitable for mapping the dynamic nature of the emotions. 
As such I suggest two dimensions – one of temporal orientation and one of 
temporal duration – which between them are very helpful in differentiating 
our emotion concepts. Specifically the dimension of temporal orientation is 
an efficient way to distinguish emotions like fear and sadness. These emo-
tions may be identically valenced, constrained and weak; yet sadness is 
prototypically past directed, where fear is prototypically future directed (at 
least in English). In between these two extremes, we also recognize a neutral 
‘current’ point, in which emotions like surprise can be found.
Note that we can apply this dimension to inner feelings as well as behav-
iours by recognizing the extent to which these things seem to build towards 
some climax or fade away. Such feelings can indicate the meaning of an 
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emotion, particularly the recognition that an urgent response is called for, or 
the seriousness of the situation.
4.7 Temporal duration (enduring–sudden)
Alongside the dimension of temporal flow, a dimension of temporal dura-
tion helps to distinguish states like surprise and shock (where shock is more 
enduring), as well as long-term dispositions or attitudes from more episodic 
states, e.g. the difference between an episodic loving feeling and the more 
enduring disposition towards caring for another.
Overall, this dimension can range from a momentary blip in arousal to 
an emotion disposition that lasts a lifetime. Note also that, because the 
concept of disposition is commonly employed to explain how a person can 
have a single emotion towards the same stimulus over several years, we 
need not worry so much that one could not have an extremely enduring 
emotion which is simultaneously extremely powerful or constrained (i.e. 
one simply could not have the energy for it). We need only recognize that, 
to the extent that one can be attributed a single emotion over an extremely 
long period of time, it is possible for one to feel weak at the knees every 
time one sees a spider or feel incredibly constrained every time one consid-
ers one’s mortality. Apart from the mere duration of emotional activity, we 
can also associate the different extremes of this dimension with our attune-
ment towards novelty (suddenness) and the process by which we develop 
habitual responses (enduring).
4.8 Social connection (connected–disconnected)
Finally, although appraisal-based models such as Ellsworth & Smith (1985), 
Oatley & Johnson-Laird (1987) and Scherer, Dan & Flykt (2006) recognize 
the importance of social relations in emotions to some extent, it is surprising 
that a dimension of social connectivity is not commonly employed (though 
see Davitz, 1969).20 It is a very easy way to divide the field of emotions, 
helping us to differentiate emotions like love, jealousy and hatred. That is, 
love is prototypically an intimate, socially connected state, whereas jealousy 
is disconnected to some extent (though seeking greater connection) and 
hatred is an extremely disconnected state.
On this dimension, states like shame, guilt or embarrassment should be 
interpreted as (at least mildly) disconnected. Though those undergoing these 
emotions may be particularly sensitive to the attitudes of others and desirous 
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to bond with others, these emotions indicate a failure of social bonding. One 
feels oneself to be on a trajectory towards a greater disconnection, which 
one must then correct. Social connectivity is basically associated with our 
ability to empathize with others, but at an intense level of connection this is 
also a matter of intimacy with others. Our capacity to calculate social status 
should then be regarded as a combination of this dimension and the dimen-
sions of power and/or freedom.
Note also that an emotion involving extreme social connection need not 
be a positively valenced state. One could, as a group, be extremely repulsed 
by some other group. Or, more unusually, one might love someone so much 
that one feels compelled to kill them (or sacrifice oneself).
Finally, asocial emotions like the disgust for rotting food qualify as neu-
tral on this dimension. One’s relatedness to others is simply not information 
that is given by these sorts of emotions; they do not make one more or less 
socially connected. It is on this basis that quite a fundamental distinction can 
be given between the class of social emotions and the class of asocial emo-
tions. Often this boundary is not emphasized in the English concepts of 
emotions like fear, anger and sadness. As observed in the results presented 
below, however, distinctions are often made on this basis in other cultures.
5. Tests and results
These results demonstrate some of the ways in which the eight-dimensional 
model of emotion concepts can be used to distinguish emotion language. Of 
course more robust confirmation will rely on detailed comparisons with 
other-dimension models, not just in the field of emotion language but also 
behavioural observations and experiential self-reports. Given the priorities 
of this model, it is also important to confirm whether ordinary subjects can 
intuitively and consistently apply the definitions provided. We are interested 
not only in pragmatic applications here but also in the extent to which the 
model assists us in understanding the nature of specific emotions.
5.1 Examples of differentiated emotion terms within a 
language (English)
Figures 1 to 4 provide examples of how the dimensions can effectively dif-
ferentiate emotion concepts within a language like English. The specific 
mappings are based purely on my intuitive grasp of these concepts, and as 
such are open to challenge or more robust empirical confirmation. The point 
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here is merely to show that such differentiation is possible. The emotions 
terms were taken from Shaver et al. (1987) and correspond to three levels at 
which emotion terms are classified in their system, ranging from the broadest 
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For simplicity of presentation, in each case two dimensions were selected 
that seemed effectively to differentiate the overall field.21 Naturally, were all 
eight dimensions employed, far more effective distinctions could be made, 
though this becomes progressively harder as one moves towards the extremely 
subtle distinctions within subclasses of terms. Within the nervousness sub-
class for instance, all of the emotion terms would be quite similarly future 
directed, weak, constrained and repulsed (and neutral on social connectedness 
without further details). Yet anxiety is typically more enduring than uneasi-
ness, tenseness is slightly more powerful than nervousness, and apprehension 
is slightly more future directed than tenseness. None of these differences 
would be captured by the traditional valence or arousal dimensions.
Our capacity to be responsive to these sorts of differences helps to con-
firm that each of the dimensions outlined is necessary for distinguishing our 
emotions. We are able to recognize the difference between two emotions 
that are identical in most respects, except that one involves a slightly greater 
sense of imminence, or generality, or attraction, and so on. Typically these 
subtle differences do not merit a distinct label, but they are an important part 
of the meaning conveyed by the emotion. Then, at the boundaries of our 
conception of an emotion, a subtle dimensional difference can suffice to 
make us appeal to one label over another.
5.2 Examples of differentiated emotion terms across languages
In addition to characterizing and differentiating terms within a single language, 
the dimensions can be equally employed for cross-cultural comparisons. 
Needing an arbitrary set of non-English emotion terms to demonstrate this, 
I have used the set of non-English terms referenced in James Russell’s well-
known paper ‘Culture and the categorization of emotions’ (1991). Terms could 
be selected quite strictly according to whether a description is provided that is 
greater than a one-to-one correspondence with an English term. Descriptions 
ranged from a couple of English terms (e.g. ‘covers both shame and fear’) to 
highly literary descriptions (see for instance litost or amae). Having generated 
a set, I could then confirm or disambiguate the descriptions by reference to the 
original sources as well as, in some cases, descriptions by other researchers. 
However, it should be recognized that, given the indirect sources, some distor-
tions in definition are possible. The point is primarily to show that, whatever 
definitions are given, the dimensions can be usefully applied.
In total there were 43 terms originating from 18 distinct cultures. I have pro-
vided a sample of 10 of these (from 10 different cultures) in Table 1 (the com-
plete list appears in the Appendix). These samples were selected to demonstrate 
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that the dimensional extremes of each of the eight dimensions (including, in the 
case of temporal flow, the ‘current’ position) are all strongly indicated by at least 
one of the terms. This helps to confirm that all of these dimensions play a sig-
nificant role in capturing the way we conceive of emotions cross-culturally. For 
instance we see that the traditional models would not capture the sense of gen-
erality that is important to several of the emotion concepts listed. Note, how-
ever, that these results do not confirm all of these dimensions as necessary for 
distinguishing our emotions, since it is possible that some dimensions are 
redundant for differentiating a given field (necessity can only be confirmed by 
the sorts of subtle cases described in the previous section).
Moreover, looking at the complete list we see that the social connectivity 
of 10 out of 43 of the emotion concepts is either neutral or not indicated, 
similarly for the temporal duration of 12 out of 43 of the emotions, the prob-
ability of 5 out of 43, and the temporal flow of 3 out of 43.22 In some cases, 
this is clearly a consequence of broad definitions. It is also not particularly 
surprising in the case of temporal duration, since in English the duration of 
an emotion is one of its most variable properties, and typically where tem-
poral duration is not indicated then either temporal flow or probability 
applies instead. With regard to social connectivity, however, there does seem 
to be an important distinction between the social and asocial emotions.
5.3 Subtle expressive language
Another interesting way to test the discriminatory powers of the dimensions 
is to use them to analyse prose, which is more impressionistically suggestive 
of emotions, since these works may well express affective states that have no 
emotion label.23 To give an example, I have analysed a poem by W. B. Yeats 
(see Table 2).
There are several explicit emotion terms in this poem – hate, love, 
happiness – but these are all negated, indicating by contrast a state of more 
neutral valence. The narrator only affirms a ‘lonely impulse of delight’ – hardly 
a common emotion label – which the dimensions are completely able to 
characterize as sudden, free, attracted and disconnected.
Table 2 shows how we are able to apply the emotion dimensions line by 
line, serving to capture various nuances of expressive meaning. Both the 
poem and the dimensional values can then be quite clearly combined in five 
groups, each of which expresses a distinct affective state. None of these 
affective states is stereotypical: We find a sense of being fated, equanimous, 
a confident sense of being rooted in a culture (I would not call it patriotism 
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since this to my mind would require a greater sense of devotion), the ‘lonely 
impulse of delight’ and then at the end a very generalized and enduring 
repulsion (i.e. about life), which I have labelled ‘existential repulsion’.
Finally we can try to sum up the affective tone of the poem as a whole. 
We can do this in two ways: either by tracing the fluctuations along the 
various dimensions throughout (from constraint to freedom, from focused to 
generalized, from disconnection to connection back to disconnection again); 
or by averaging the values on each dimension overall. If this latter method 
is employed then we arrive at a state that is strongly certain, strongly discon-
nected, strongly generalized, enduring, powerful, free, mildly future directed 
and mildly repulsed. The combination of power, freedom and repulsion is 
quite unusual. It indicates an aloof attitude, almost carefree, which is only 
Table 2 
analysis of emotion terms in a poem by W. b. Yeats grouped by dimensional value
An Irish airman foresees his death (William butler Yeats)
I know that I shall meet my fate strongly certain, strongly  
 constrained, future fated
Somewhere among the clouds above; mildly focused, mildly free
Those that I fight I do not hate powerful, neutrally valent, 
 disconnected equanimous
Those that I guard I do not love; powerful, neutrally valent,
 disconnected
My county is Kiltartan Cross, connected, focused 
My countrymen Kiltartan’s poor, connected, focused, mildly
 weak rooted
No likely end could bring them loss certain, powerful, future
 directed
Or leave them happier than before. future directed, neutrally valent
Nor law, nor duty bade me fight, strongly free, disconnected 
Nor public men, nor cheering crowds, strongly free, disconnected lonely impulse
A lonely impulse of delight  sudden, free, attracted, impulse of
 disconnected delight
Drove to this tumult in the clouds; attracted, free
I balanced all, brought all to mind, generalized 
The years to come seemed waste of future directed, enduring, 
breath, generalized, repulsed existential
A waste of breath the years behind  past directed, enduring, repulsion
 generalized, repulsed
In balance with this life, this death. current, generalized, enduring
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intensified by the strong sense of disconnection. The poem also indicates 
that this state is quite profound in its generality and endurance. The sense of 
certainty further intensifies this impression. Altogether this particular com-
bination of dimensions reads like an almost Zen-like detachment from life. 
Reading the poem in a less technical manner, the narrator expresses perfect 
equanimity in the prospect of a ‘wasted’ death. Yet the narrator is not merely 
whimsical. He seems like a strong, rooted sort of person. The dimensional 
analysis coheres extremely well with this interpretation.
5.4 Exploring the dimensions
In general we can use the dimensions to explore what sorts of affective states 
are possible. For instance a state of extreme power, freedom, attraction, 
certainty, generality, connection and endurance which is also current or 
future directed seems like one of the most blissful emotions imaginable 
(though the concept of ‘bliss’ seems less powerful and less essentially con-
nected), what one might feel on being admitted into the heavenly host. In 
contrast a state of extremely sudden and current weakness, constraint, repul-
sion, uncertainty, generality and disconnection looks like a momentary feeling 
of horror, that the world is an utterly nightmarish place. We also find some 
unusual combinations, such as extreme power and uncertainty, perhaps the 
feeling that one has by pure chance defeated one’s enemy. Or the combi-
nation of intense freedom and connection, a sense of group solidarity that 
promises the ability to achieve many things.
A related way to test the usefulness and validity of these dimensions is 
to observe whether, when given a set of specific measures on the different 
scales, subjects are able to identify the same emotion term. For instance, if 
an emotion is described as extremely past directed and constrained, but quite 
attracted, quite generalized and fairly weak (and is neutral on other dimen-
sions) will subjects commonly identify a sense of nostalgia?
6. Theoretical implications
A certain number of implicit theoretical assumptions accompany the use 
of a dimension model to describe the emotions. I have already noted an 
assumption that we conceive of emotional states as analogue entities in 
several respects. I have also assumed that we are generally concerned with 
the intentional focus of the emotion. But more importantly a model like this 
defines emotions as phenomena accurately captured by the terms of the 
dimensions and moreover as varying along these dimensions as they 
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progress. We must therefore carefully appraise to what extent this model is 
reckoned to capture the reality of emotions.
In particular we note that the dimensions do not necessarily capture every-
thing about an emotion concept, only what is required to distinguish it from 
other emotions. For instance jealousy might be identified without having to 
refer to infidelities. Nor need one refer to the feeling of sickliness that often 
accompanies this emotion.24 These features did not merit their own dimen-
sions because they were too specific. For example the concept of infidelity 
overlaps with social connection but does not discriminate the field as effec-
tively because of the large number of emotions to which it is irrelevant. The 
rejection of such specific dimensions may thereby suggest that some details 
are not essential to an emotion’s identity.
Again it seems that the dimensions can also cover our concepts of various 
kinds of affective states (dispositions, moods, bodily sensations and so on). 
In this case, with regard to the question of how these states are differentiated 
from emotions, one might think that this is a matter of degree. Emotions are 
perhaps more episodic – more generalized than mere bodily sensations, 
while more focused than dispositions – but there need not be any fundamen-
tal differences.
In both cases, drawing such a conclusion would be a mistake, at least 
from the evidence that this conceptual model provides. It is important to 
note that the dimensions may grasp only certain significant boundaries of 
an emotion, and not its core identity. One might say that the dimensions 
represent a certain level of the reality of emotions – the field of affective 
phenomena as a whole. At this level we can take an abstract and structural 
perspective, identifying emotions by picking out certain abstract patterns 
rather than very specific biological functions, patterns corresponding to the 
fluctuations within the elusive mental realm of ‘well-being’ or ‘how things 
are going’.
So can we say that generally sadness is a past-directed, aversive, con-
strained and weak state? I believe so. But this description is a summary.25 
What underlies that summary is the synchronized functioning of often doz-
ens of distinct physiological, behavioural and cognitive functions. In the 
definitions I gave of the various dimensions, I noted various component 
functions that are plausibly responsible for outputs on those dimensions. 
This is because the independence of the dimensions suggests that distinct 
mechanisms can be identified. But it is not necessary that these mechanisms 
are responsible for every instance in which a value is outputted on the cor-
responding dimension. Rather we may point to clusters of bodily or behav-
ioural or neural functions that track different dimensions, observing that 
some emotion-generating functions (like muscle tension) may contribute to 
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more than one dimension at the same time. It is hoped that future research 
will identify in detail which functions correspond with which dimensions. 
This should make a significant difference in our capacity to measure specific 
emotions, helping us to move beyond the mere recognition that someone is 
aroused, by targeting aspects of emotional states that make all the difference 
for the subjects undergoing them.
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Notes
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 1. Words like ‘dreary’, ‘disgraced’ or ‘dazed’. See Ortony, Clore & Foss (1987) for several 
categories of examples.
 2. For a good review of the history of dimension models see Smith & Ellsworth (1985).
 3. Capturing emotional experience is not easy of course, but this is often where the success 
of artistic expression resides.
 4. But how about ‘I’m dying and this is the best/worst thing that’s ever happened to me’? I 
imagine that in extremis where one’s body is not working flat-out in the struggle to maintain 
life, i.e. is finally going through the stages of shutting down, then one’s sense of valence will 
be equally impaired.
 5. Though not identical, since Plutchik’s model is a combination of dimensional and basic 
emotion schemas, where his basic emotions are arranged in a circle according to their relative 
similarity rather than according to their positions on two dimensions.
 6. Even in the case of curved space, for instance on the 2-dimensional surface of a globe, it 
remains possible to occupy any latitude, whilst simultaneously occupying any longitude, and 
vice versa, except at the poles, where longitude becomes meaningless (our emotion dimensions 
will be similarly bounded).
 7. Scherer, Dan & Flykt (2006: 93) suggest that the activity dimension can be correlated 
with the appraisal of a mismatch between goals/expectations and the current state, such that it 
demands some sort of aroused response. The connection is plausible, and the two sides of the 
comparison are suitably similar in generality, but this generality suggests that the mismatch 
with expectations does not correspond to a single dimension. It looks more like a general 
condition for the occurrence of an emotion, rather than a way to differentiate within the field 
of emotions.
 8. Examples include, ‘wanted to be in command of others’, ‘person was at the centre 
of attention’.
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 9. See Wilson (2004) for extensive criticism of this methodological bias. See also 
Youngstrom & Green (2003) for discussion of the importance of looking at groups other than 
college students.
10. Depending on one’s definition of predictability, see discussion in section 4.4 below. Note 
that the label is an interpretation by the researchers of what unifies several features grouped 
together by factorial analysis. It is not an unreasonable choice since the features ‘unpredictable 
event’ and ‘consequences predictable’ are two of most significant loadings on this dimension. 
Yet given that ‘had the jaw drop’ vs. ‘experienced the emotional state for a long time’ score the 
highest on this dimension, a label of ‘temporal duration’ is at least as appropriate (cf. my adop-
tion of this dimension below).
11. Solomon even missed one – the degree to which an emotion is adaptive, according 
to which most emotions might be said to be positive (thanks to Geraldine Coppin for this 
observation).
12. Though note that, if independent emotion generating components underlie the dimen-
sions, then it is possible that in some cases not all such components are in operation.
13. This is even the case if the basic emotions model is correct, since, although we would 
expect terms to bunch up in families, these models typically allow that the basic emotions can 
be blended in various subtle ways.
14. One could also get a more even spread by removing the emotion of surprise!
15. Similarly, were I to select dimensions for some other feature of human life, such as one’s 
economic status, I might well equally employ the same fundamental concepts listed above, but 
I would drop valence and start with a dimension of relative richness.
16. Moreover Roseman appeals to an additional dimension of a situation being motive con-
sistent–inconsistent, where my definition of valence covers both sorts of cases.
17. Of course, as the prisoner continues to struggle, he may realize the futility of his actions, 
and his sense of futility may well deflate his sense of power, most likely because he realizes his 
loss of environmental supports and accordingly his capacity to continue struggling indefinitely.
18. An extreme degree of generalization could help to indicate pathological affective states 
(thanks to Anna Ogarkova for this observation).
19. This may indicate a subcategory of emotions rather than a distinct kind of affective state.
20. For a long time I considered using two dimensions to differentiate social emotions: one 
of social sensitivity (being sensitive to the emotions of others) and one of social similarity 
(being in the same emotional state as others). However, it became clear that one could not be 
extremely socially similar at the same time as extremely socially insensitive.
21. In general it may be considered impractical for subjects or experimenters to rate emotions 
on all the dimensions given in this model. However, experimenters can instead focus on one or 
two dimensions that are relevant to their investigative interests. For instance, if one is chiefly 
interested in measuring anger and happiness, then one can narrow one’s focus to the dimensions 
of freedom and valence.
22. The single case in which valence is neutrally indicated is the !Kung emotion kua, where 
it is highly ambivalent or mixed rather than irrelevant. Similarly for the sense of personal 
strength, we see only one ambivalent case, where the Canadian Inuit emotion hatuq is supposed 
to cover both kindness (where one has the ability to help others, indicating relative strength) 
and gratitude (where one is receiving help from others, indicating relative weakness).
23. I am also confident that most, if not all, of these dimensions will be applicable to abstract 
music.
24. Notably in Mandarin, jealousy is chī cù, translating literally as ‘to eat vinegar’.
25. Similarly this description could itself be summarized as the feeling of loss (cf. Lazarus, 
1991).
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 i
nv
es
ti
ga
ti
on
 w
e 
se
e 
th
at
 i
t 
‘i
s 
th
e 
em
ot
io
n 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 m
os
t 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
ob
ed
ie
nt
 a
nd
 g
oo
d 
be
ha
vi
or
’ 
(L
ut
z,
 1
98
2:
 1
21
),
 
in
di
ca
ti
ng
 a
 s
oc
ia
l a
nd
 d
is
po
si
ti
on
al
 e
m
ot
io
n.
12
.  T
ho
ug
h 
th
e 
su
bj
ec
t m
ay
 w
el
l b
e 
ab
le
 to
 r
ec
og
ni
ze
 th
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 c
au
se
 o
f 
hi
s 
em
ot
io
n.
 T
o 
fe
el
 la
ss
it
ud
e 
in
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 s
ig
na
ls
 a
 m
oo
d-
li
ke
 a
tt
it
ud
e 
to
w
ar
ds
 th
e 
w
or
ld
.
13
. I
t i
s 
cl
ea
r 
fr
om
 th
is
 d
ef
in
it
io
n—
as
 w
el
l a
s 
fr
om
 R
os
al
do
’s
 o
th
er
 d
es
cr
ip
ti
on
s—
th
at
 li
ge
t s
ig
na
ls
 a
 g
en
er
al
 s
en
se
 o
f 
pa
ss
io
n.
14
. C
f.
 M
ag
eo
 (
19
91
: 4
08
).
15
.  W
hi
le
 i
t 
is
 n
ot
 m
ad
e 
cl
ea
r 
in
 R
us
se
ll
’s
 d
es
cr
ip
ti
on
, 
cl
os
er
 i
nv
es
ti
ga
ti
on
 i
nt
o 
th
is
 t
er
m
 r
ev
ea
ls
 t
ha
t 
it
 i
s 
a 
di
sp
os
it
io
na
l 
st
at
e.
 A
nt
hr
op
ol
og
is
t 
Je
an
ne
tt
e 
M
ar
ie
 
M
ag
eo
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
th
is
 d
es
cr
ip
ti
on
: 
‘t
ho
se
 w
ho
 a
re
 l
ot
of
a’
am
au
al
al
o 
ne
ve
r 
pl
ac
e 
th
ei
r 
se
ni
or
s 
in
 a
 s
it
ua
ti
on
 t
ha
t 
im
pa
ir
s 
th
ei
r 
au
th
or
it
y.
 O
ne
 i
nf
or
m
an
t 
ga
ve
 t
he
 
fo
ll
ow
in
g 
ex
am
pl
e.
 A
 y
ou
ng
er
 b
ro
th
er
 a
sk
s 
hi
s 
ai
ga
 f
or
 p
er
m
is
si
on
 to
 b
ui
ld
 a
 h
ou
se
 o
n 
a 
pi
ec
e 
of
 f
am
il
y 
la
nd
. A
n 
ol
de
r 
si
st
er
 th
en
 n
ot
ic
es
 h
ow
 n
ic
e 
th
e 
pi
ec
e 
is
 a
nd
 s
o 
sh
e 
as
ks
 f
or
 i
t 
to
o.
 T
he
 b
ro
th
er
 w
ho
 i
s 
lo
to
fa
’a
m
au
al
al
o 
w
it
hd
ra
w
s 
hi
s 
re
qu
es
t 
be
ca
us
e 
hi
s 
si
st
er
 i
s 
th
e 
el
de
r. 
O
n 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
ha
nd
, 
if
 t
he
 s
is
te
r 
is
 
lo
to
fa
’a
m
au
al
al
o 
sh
e 
w
il
l r
el
in
qu
is
h 
th
e 
la
nd
, a
lt
ho
ug
h 
by
 r
ig
ht
 o
f 
st
at
us
 h
er
s 
is
 th
e 
be
tt
er
 c
la
im
’ (
19
91
: 4
12
)
16
.  I
 f
ra
nk
ly
 f
in
d 
th
is
 d
es
cr
ip
ti
on
 t
o 
be
 p
ar
ad
ox
ic
al
. 
I 
ca
n 
th
in
k 
of
 n
o 
ca
se
s 
of
 f
ea
r 
in
 E
ng
li
sh
 t
ha
t 
ar
e 
no
t 
ce
nt
ra
ll
y 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
se
d 
by
 b
ei
ng
 d
ir
ec
te
d 
to
w
ar
ds
 t
he
 
fu
tu
re
, w
he
th
er
 it
 is
 im
m
in
en
t o
r 
di
st
an
t. 
N
ev
er
th
el
es
s 
th
e 
di
ff
er
en
t T
ah
it
ia
n 
co
nc
ep
ts
 o
f 
fe
ar
 a
re
 w
el
l d
is
ti
ng
ui
sh
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
di
m
en
si
on
 o
f 
te
m
po
ra
l f
lo
w
.
